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Abstract. In voting systems, game theory, switching functions, thresh-
old logic, hypergraphs or coherent structures there is an important prob-
lem that consists in determining the weightedness of a voting system by
means of trades among voters in sets of coalitions. The fundamental
theorem by Taylor and Zwicker [8] establishes the equivalence between
weighted voting games and k-trade robust games for each positive in-
teger k. Moreover, they also construct, in [9], a succession of games Gk
based on magic squares which are (k − 1)-trade robust but not k-trade
robust, each one of these games Gk has k
2 players.
The goal of this paper is to provide improvements by means of differ-
ent experiments to the problem described above. In particular, we will
classify all complete games (a basic class of games) of less than eight
players according to they are: a weighted voting game or a game which
is (k − 1)-trade robust but not k-trade robust for all values of k. As a
consequence it will we showed the existence of games with less than k2
players which are (k − 1)-trade robust but not k-trade robust. We want
to point out that the classifications obtained in this paper by means of
experiments are new in the mentioned fields.
1 Introduction
Simple games can be viewed as models of voting systems in which a single
alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo.
Definition 1. A simple game G is a pair (N,W) in which N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
and W is a collection of subsets of N that satisfies: N ∈ W, ∅ /∈ W and (mono-
tonicity) S ∈ W and S ⊆ T ⊆ N then T ∈ W.
Any set of voters is called a coalition, and the set N is called the grand coali-
tion. Members of N are called players or voters, and the subsets of N that are in
W are called winning coalitions. The intuition here is that a set S is a winning
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coalition iff the bill or amendment passes when the players in S are precisely the
ones who voted for it. A subset of N that is not inW is called a losing coalition.
A minimal winning coalition is a winning coalition all of whose proper subsets
are losing. Because of monotonicity, any simple game is completely determined
by its set of minimal winning coalitions. Before proceeding, we introduce some
real–world examples of simple games (see Taylor [7] for more details on these
examples).
Example 1. The European Economic Community (1958). In 1958, the Treaty
of Rome established the existence of a binary voting system called the Euro-
pean Economic Community. The voters in this system were the following six
countries: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
France, Germany and Italy were given four votes each, while Belgium and the
Netherlands were given two votes and Luxembourg one. Passage required a to-
tal quota of at least twelve of the seventeen votes. The European Economic
Community was altered several times with the addition of new countries and a
reallocation of votes. The current version was approved in the Nice European
summit, held in December 2000.
Example 2. The United Nations Security Council. The voters in this system are
the fifteen countries that make up the Security Council, five of which are called
permanent members whereas the other ten are called non-permanent members.
Passage requires a total of at least nine of the fifteen possible votes, subject to
a veto due to a nay vote from any one of the five permanent members. This
example ignores abstention. For a treatment of this example considering the
possibility of abstention we refer the reader to [4].
Example 3. The United States Federal System. There are 537 voters in this sys-
tem: 435 members of the House of Representatives, 100 members of the Senate,
the vice president, and the president. The vice president plays the role of tie–
breaker in the Senate, and the president has veto power that can be overridden
by a two–thirds vote of both the House and the Senate. Thus, for a bill to pass
it must be supported by either: 218 or more representatives and 51 or more
senators (with or without the vice president) and the president ; 218 or more
representatives and 50 senators and the vice president and the president ; or 290
or more representatives and 67 or more senators (with or without either the vice
president or the president).
Example 4. The System to Amend the Canadian Constitution. Since 1982, an
amendment to the Canadian Constitution can become law only if it is approved
by at least seven of the ten Canadian provinces, subject to the proviso that the
approving provinces have, among them, at least half of Canada’s population. It
was first studied in Kilgour [6]. A census (in percentages) for the the Canadian
provinces was: Prince Edward Island (1%), Newfoundland (3%), New Brunswick
(3%), Nova Scotia (4%), Manitoba (5%), Saskatchewan (5%), Alberta (7%),
British Columbia (9%), Quebec (29%) and Ontario (34%).
For example observe that coalitions (from now on we make use of abridge-
ments to denote the province) S1 = {PEI,New,Man, Sas,Alb, BC,Que} and
S2 = {NB,NS,Man, Sas,Alb,BC,Ont} are minimal winning coalitions be-
cause they both have exactly 7 provinces and their total population surpasses
the 50%. Instead, coalitions T1 = {Man, Sas,Alb, BC,Que,Ont} and T2 =
{PEI,New,NB,NS,Man, Sas,Alb, BC} are both losing because T1 does not
have 7 members and T2 does not reach the 50% of the total Canada’s population.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Weighted simple games
Of fundamental importance to simple games are the subclasses of weighted sim-
ple games and complete simple games.
Definition 2. A simple game G = (N,W) is said to be weighted if there exists
a “weight function” w : N → R and a real number “quota” q ∈ R such that a
coalition S is winning precisely when the sum of the weights of the players in S
meets or exceeds the quota.
The associated weight vector is (w1, . . . , wn). Any specific example of such a
weight function w : N → R and quota q as in Definition 2 are said to realize
G as a weighted game. A particular realization of a weighted simple game is
denoted as [q;w1, . . . , wn].
Example 1 corresponds to [12; 4, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1] where 4 is the weight assigned to
France, Germany and Italy, 2 the weight assigned to Belgium and the Nether-
lands and 1 the weight assigned to Luxembourg. A realization of Example 2
is [39; 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1] where 7 is the weight for a permanent
member and 1 the weight for a non–permanent member.
Simple games and in particular weighted games and complete games, which
we will introduce later on, have been studied in a variety of different mathe-
matical contexts: Boolean or switching functions, threshold logic, hypergraphs,
coherent structures, Sperner systems, and clutters. One of the most important
problems for all those fields is determining whether a simple game can be real-
ized as a weighted simple game. The only results giving necessary and sufficient
conditions can be found under one of the next three topics: geometric approach
based on separating hyperplanes; algebraic approach based on systems of linear
inequalities; approach based on trading transforms. The geometric approach re-
quires translating the question of weightedness into one of separability via a
hyperplane of two convex subsets of Rn. The key idea in the algebraic approach
involves translating weightedness via vector sums into conditions equivalent to
the solvability of systems of linear inequalities. The approach based on trades is
the most natural and suggests several interpretations that will be tackled here
from a computational viewpoint.
Definition 3. Suppose G = (N,W) is a simple game. Then a trading transform
(for G) is a coalition sequence J = 〈S1, . . . , Sj , T1, . . . , Tj〉 (from G) of even
length satisfying the following condition: |{i : p ∈ Si}| = |{i : p ∈ Ti}| for all
p ∈ N . Si are called the pre–trade coalitions and the Ti the post–trade coalitions,
and we will say that 〈S1, . . . , Sj〉 has been converted by a trade to 〈T1, . . . , Tj〉.
Definition 4. A k-trade for a simple game G is a trading transform J =
〈S1, . . . , Sj , T1, . . . , Tj〉 in which j ≤ k. The simple game G is k-trade robust
if there is no such J for which all the Ss are winning in G and all the T s are
losing in G. If G is k-trade robust for all k, then G is said to be trade robust.
Loosely speaking, G is k-trade robust if a sequence of k or fewer (not neces-
sarily distinct) winning coalitions can never be rendered losing by a trade.
Theorem 1. (Taylor and Zwicker, [8]). For a simple game G = (N,W), the
following are equivalent:
(i) G is weighted. (ii) G is trade robust. (iii) G is 22
|N|
-trade robust.
Notice that a naive checking of (iii) is a finite (albeit lengthy) process,
whereas a naive checking of weightedness directly is an infinite process. More-
over, Theorem 1 actually provides a fairly simple and uniform procedure for
showing that certain games are not weighted: one produces a sequence of win-
ning coalitions and indicates trades among these winning coalitions that convert
all of them to losing coalitions.
In Example 4 we have seen that the trading transform J = 〈S1, S2, T1, T2〉
converts the winning coalitions S1 and S2 to the losing ones T1 and T2. There-
fore, by Theorem 1, the system is not weighted. Another complex voting sys-
tem is the current European Economic Community. The countries are: Ger-
many, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania, The Nether-
lands, Greece, Czech Republic, Belgium, Hungary, Portugal, Sweden, Bulgaria,
Austria, Slovak Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slove-
nia, Estonia, Cyprus, Luxemburg and Malta. They are represented by the set
{1, 2, . . . , 27} where Germany = 1, United Kingdom = 2, and so on.
The first decision rule is the simple game given by v1 ∩ v2 ∩ v3, where the
three weighted voting games corresponding to votes, countries and population,
are the following:
v1 = [255; 29, 29, 29, 29, 27, 27, 14, 13, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 10, 10, 10, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3],
v2 = [14; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
v3 = [620; 170, 123, 122, 120, 82, 80, 47, 33, 22, 21, 21, 21, 21, 18, 17, 17, 11, 11, 11, 8, 8, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1].
Freixas [2] proves that this system cannot be expressed as intersection of
only one or two voting systems. To see that it fails to be 2-trade robust, we may
consider coalitions S1 = T1 \ {14, 15, 17} ∪ {3} and S2 = T2 \ {3} ∪ {14, 15, 17}
where T1 = [1, 2] ∪ [5, 19] ∪ {26} and T2 = [1, 13] (if i ≤ j we write [i, j] = {k ∈
N : i ≤ k ≤ j}). The corresponding weights are:
v1 v2 v3
S1 256 16 803
S2 255 15 897
v1 v2 v3
T1 254 18 727
T2 257 13 883
So after trades, the losing coalitions T1 and T2 in v convert to the winning
coalitions S1 and S2; consequently, game v cannot be weighted because, after
the trade, S1 and S2 cannot simultaneously gain weight.
The question of whether any bounded amount of trade robustness implies
weightedness was settled by Taylor and Zwicker.
Theorem 2. (Taylor and Zwicker, [9]) For each integer k ≥ 3, there exists a
simple game Gk with k2 players, that is (k − 1)-trade robust, but not k-trade
robust.
It will be of interest checking whether it exists a game with less than 9 players
being 2-trade but not 3-trade, or a game with less than 16 players being 2 and 3
trade robust but not 4-robust. If the answer to these questions were affirmative
then it would be of interest determining the minimum number of voters needed
to reach games within these categories. In this paper we will make experiments
in order to solve this problem for some values. We are also interested in studying
other cases where the game shows a considerably symmetry among voters.
Unfortunately the number of simple games is too large to be tackled straight-
forwardly. We introduce another significant class of simple games that will help
us to face our problem.
2.2 Complete simple games
Definition 5. Suppose (N,W) is a simple game. Then G is said to be swap
robust if a one–for–one exchange between two winning coalitions can never render
both losing.
Thus, swap robustness differs from trade robustness in two ways: the trades
involve only two coalitions, and the exchanges are one for one. It is fairly easy
to generate simple games that are not swap robust. A real–world example is the
U.S. federal legislative system described in Example 3 where we may choose two
coalitions formed respectively by: (a) 218 representatives, 51 senators and the
president; (b) 290 representatives and 67 senators. Both coalitions are winning,
but assume that simultaneously one senator belonging only to the first coali-
tion moves to the second coalition, and, one representative only present in the
second coalition moves to the first coalition. After these switches the coalitions
have been converted respectively to: (a) 219 representatives, 50 senators and the
president; (b) 289 representatives and 68 senators; and both coalitions become
losing showing a of swap robustness and so a failure of 2-trade robustness. Note
that this also means that the voting system is not weighted. Let us consider the
following relations.
Definition 6. Let (N,W) be a simple game, i and j be two voters. Players i
and j are said to be equally desirable, denoted by i ∼ j if: for any coalition S
such that i /∈ S and j /∈ S, S ∪ {i} ∈ W ⇔ S ∪ {j} ∈ W.
Definition 7. (Isbell, [5]) Let (N,W) be a simple game, i and j be two voters.
Player i is said to be more desirable than j, denoted by i Â j if the following two
conditions are fulfilled:
1. For every coalition S such that i /∈ S and j /∈ S, S∪{j} ∈ W ⇒ S∪{i} ∈ W.
2. There exists a coalition T such that i /∈ T and j /∈ T , T ∪ {i} ∈ W and
T ∪ {j} /∈ W.
The desirability relation denoted by º is defined in N as follows: i º j if
i Â j or i ∼ j, we say that i is at least as desirable as j as coalitional partner.
It is straightforward to check that ∼ is an equivalence relation, and that º is a
partial ordering of the resulting equivalence classes.
Definition 8. A simple game (N,W) is complete or linear if the desirability
relation is a complete preordering.
In a complete simple game we may decompose N in a collection of subsets,
called classes, N1 > N2 > · · · > Nt forming a partition of N and understanding
that if i ∈ Np and j ∈ Nq then: p = q iff i ∼ j and p < q if i Â j. The following
is a characterization of complete simple games.
Theorem 3. (Taylor and Zwicker, [10]) G is a complete simple game iff G is
swap robust.
Because trade robustness implies swap robustness it may be concluded that
if a simple game is weighted then it is complete. Carreras and Freixas [1] provide
a classification theorem for complete simple games that allow to enumerate all
these games up to isomorphism by listing the possible values of certain invariants.
Previously to state it we need some preliminaries.
If n = (n1, . . . , nt) ∈ Nt, we define Λ(n) = {m ∈ (N∪ {0})t : m ≤ n} the set
of all vectors m = (m1, . . . ,mt) whose components satisfy 0 ≤ mk ≤ nk for all
k = 1, . . . , t with the ordering δ given by the comparison of partial sums; that
is,
mδ p iff
k∑
i=1
mi ≥
k∑
i=1
pi for k = 1, 2, . . . , t.
If mδ p we will say that m δ-dominates p. If mδ/ p and p δ/ m we will say that m
and p are not δ-comparable. From now on, we shall write Σk(m) =
∑k
i=1mi for
k = 1, 2, . . . , t and Σ(m) = (Σ1(m), . . . , Σt(m)) so that mδ p iff Σ(m) ≥ Σ(p).
It is not difficult to check that the couple (Λ(n), δ) is a distributive lattice.
Finally, two simple games (N,W) and (N ′,W ′) are said to be isomorphic if
there is a bijective map f : N → N ′ such that S ∈ W iff f(S) ∈ W ′; f is called
an isomorphism of simple games.
To make understandable the following theorem we need to introduce the
lexicographical ordering by partial sums. If h < h′, then there exists some l such
that Σk(mh) = Σk(mh′) for k < l and Σl(mh) > Σl(mh′).
Theorem 4. (Carreras and Freixas, [1])
Part A Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple game with nonempty classes
N1 > N2 > · · · > Nt, let n be the vector defined by their cardinalities, and
let M = (mi,j), with 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ t, be the matrix satisfying the
four conditions below:
(1) mi,j ∈ N∪{0} and 0 ≤ mi,j ≤ ni for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ t;
(2) every pair of rows of M, mh and mh′ are not δ-comparable if h 6= h′;
(3) if t = 1 then m1,1 > 0; if t > 1 then for every k < t there exists some h
such that mh,k > 0 and mh,(k+1) < nk+1; and
(4) the rows of M are lexicographically ordered by partial sums.
Part B (Uniqueness) Two complete simple games (N,W) and (N ′,W ′) are iso-
morphic iff n = n′ and M =M′.
Part C (Existence) Given a vector n and a matrix M satisfying the conditions
of part A, there exists a complete simple game (N,W) the characteristic
invariants of which are n and M.
We need now to describe how to get (n,M) from (N,W) and reciprocally.
As (N,W) is a complete simple game either i Â j, or i ∼ j, or j Â i for all
pair of voters. Voters being equally desirable are grouped in classes Nk, and
the notation Np > Nq means that i Â j for each i ∈ Np and j ∈ Nq, Let
N1 > N2 > · · · > Nt. Components of vector n are defined by nk = |Nk|.
Rows of M are obtained in the following way, for each S ∈ W we consider the
associated vector s ∈ Λ(n) with components sk = |S ∩ Nk|, s is a row of M if
it is not dominated for any other vector associated to a winning coalition. Once
the collection of non-dominated vectors corresponding to winning coalitions is
determined we need to order them lexicographically. Reciprocally, given n and
M let n = Σt(n) = n1+n2+ · · ·+nt be the number of players, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
be the set of players, and N1, N2, . . . , Nt be subsets of N formed, respectively,
by n1, n2, . . . , nt elements (which may be chosen following the natural ordering).
By Theorem 4(A), none of these subsets is empty. For each S ⊆ N we consider
s = (s1, s2, . . . , st), where sk = |S ∩ Nk| for k = 1, 2, . . . , t. Then, the set of
winning coalitions is W = {S ⊆ N : s δ mh for some row mh ofM}.
Theorem 4 is a parametrization theorem, because it allows one to enumerate
all complete games up to isomorphism by listing the possible values o certain
invariants. Let us consider the examples previously introduced, we may easily
deduce that the characteristic invariants of Example 1 are:
n = (3, 2, 1), M =
(
3 0 0
2 2 0
)
The characteristic invariants for Example 2 are: n = (5, 10), M = (5 4). For
Example 4 we obtain n = (2, 8), M = (1 6). Oppositely, Example 3 is not
complete so cannot be represented by means of the characteristic invariants.
Although the voting system of the current European Economic Community is
complete its representation using characteristic invariants is a bit complex.
3 Experiments on the complex simple games
3.1 A new theoretical approach to performance experiments
In this subsection we reformulate the developed theory in the preceding section
in order to deal with it from a more efficient computational viewpoint. For lack
of space, we just give here the main ideas of some new theoretical results.
In general, to describe a simple game it is enough giving the list of minimal
winning coalitions. If moreover, the game is complete and the ordering induced
by the desirability relation among components is known, then we can use a subset
of minimal winning coalitions to entirely describe the game. Indeed, a coalition
S such that its associated vector s is a row of M is called a δ-minimal winning
coalition. Notice that each δ-minimal winning coalition is a minimal winning
coalition but the reciprocal is not true. For instance, in Example 4 a coalition
formed by Ontario, Quebec and 5 more provinces is minimal winning but not
δ-minimal winning since its associated vector (2, 5) is not a row of matrix M.
For the purpose of studying when a game is weighted in terms of trade
robustness we may confine to study only complete simple games, because the
remaining simple games are not swap robust which is the simplest case of not
being 2-trade robust. Within the framework of complete simple games we can
take advantage of using the equivalent representation (n,M), which allows us-
ing models of coalitions instead of coalitions and considering only models which
are rows of matrix M. These latter properties become essential in this section
devoted to algorithms and experiments. The basic idea is that it simplifies the
description of the algorithms as well as it meaningfully improves the performance
of the experiments.
Definition 9. (cf. Definition 3) Suppose G = (N,W) is a simple game. Then a
δ-trading transform (for G) is a coalition sequence J = 〈S1, . . . , Sj , T1, . . . , Tj〉
(from G) of even length satisfying condition |{i : p ∈ Si}| = |{i : p ∈ Ti}| for
all p ∈ N , where S1, . . . , Sj are δ-minimal winning coalitions.
Definition 10. (cf. Definition 4) A k-δ-trade for a simple game G is a δ-trading
transform J = 〈S1, . . . , Sj , T1, . . . , Tj〉 in which j ≤ k. The simple game G is
k-δ-trade robust if there is no such J for which all the Ss are δ-minimal winning
coalitions in G and all the T s are losing in G. If G is k-δ-trade robust for all k,
then G is said to be δ-trade robust.
Proposition 1. Let G = (N,W) be a complete game. Then, G is k-trade robust
iff G is k-δ-trade robust.
In the following, we provide a trading version applied to indices of columns
of M and vectors instead of players and coalitions.
Definition 11. Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple game with characteristic
invariants (n,M). A vectorial trading transform for G is a vectorial sequence
J ′ = 〈x1, . . . , xj , y1, . . . , yj〉 of even length satisfying the following conditions:
r∑
j=1
xi,j =
r∑
j=1
yi,j ∀ i ∈ [1, t] (1)
where y1, . . . , yj belong to Λ(n) and, moreover, x1, . . . , xj are rows of M with
repetitions allowed.
Definition 12. Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple game with characteristic
invariants (n,M). Then, G is k-invariant-trade robust (k-I-T-R, for short) if
there is no a vectorial trading transform J ′ = 〈x1, . . . , xj , y1, . . . , yj〉 such that
each xi is a row of M and each yk ∈ Λ(n) for 1 ≤ k ≤ j satisfies ykδ/ mi for
every row mi of M. If G is k-I-T-R for all positive integer k, then (N,W) is
invariant-trade robust (I-T-R, for short).
The following proposition states that Definitions 11 and 12 merely correspond
to Definitions 9 and 10 if we consider the context (n,M) instead of (N,W). We
omit the proof because applying Proposition 1 it follows that k-trade robust is
equivalent to k-δ-trade robust and word–by–word this is equivalent to k-I-T-R.
Proposition 2. Let G = (N,W) be a simple game with characteristic invari-
ants (n,M). Then, (N,W) is k-trade robust iff (n,M) is k-I-T-R.
Theorem 1 by Taylor and Zwicker for simple games can be adapted to com-
plete simple games.
Theorem 5. Let G be a complete simple game (N,W) with characteristic in-
variants (n,M) and t being the number of columns if M. Then,
(i) G is weighted. (ii) G is invariant-trade robust. (iii) G is 22
t
-I-T-R.
3.2 A full classification for complete simple games with less than
eight voters
All experiments we have made are based on Theorem 5. It gives a new view-
point to determine if a complete simple game is trade robust. Our programs1
have been written for C++ and run under Linux in Pentium 4 at 1.7 GHz with
512 Mb of RAM. To set an example, we just sketch here one of the imple-
mented algorithms. So, Algorithm 1 sketches the used recursive function (based
on backtracking method) to determine if a given simple game with characteristic
invariants (n,M) is k-I-T-R or not. The parameters of function DoingForkTrade
mean the following: M and n are the given matrix and vector, r and t are the
number of computed rows and columns for the current matrix Y = (yi,j),2 and
finally, the auxiliary parameter aux is used to improve the algorithm. This func-
tion calls three additional functions:
– Function CanonicalMatrix(Y) returns true if the rows of Y are in lexico-
graphic order (by rows and by columns), false otherwise.
– Function AnyRowOfYDominatesM(Y,M) returns true if any row of Y dom-
inates at least one row of M, false otherwise.
– Function PartialSums(M, ir, er, it, et) adds up the integers of M from row
ir to row er and from column it to column et.
In general, given (n,M) and a positive integer k, calling the recursive function
DoingForkTrade(M,Y, n, 1, 1,PartialSums(M, 1, k, 1, 1)), it returns true (Line
20) if it is k-I-T-R, and false (Line 7) otherwise.
1 They are available on request from the authors.
2 We denote by Y any of the matrices with rows y1, . . . , yj that are solution of equation
in Definition 11, showing a failure of j-trade robust.
Algorithm 1 Recursive function that returns true iff (n,M) is k-I-T-R follow-
ing the criteria of Proposition 2
1. procedure DoingForkTrade(M,Y, n, r, t, aux)
2. if (r = k) then / ∗ k-th row of Y ∗ /
3. yr,t := aux;
4. if yr,t > nt or aux < 0 then return true fi
5. if t = Colums Of Matrix(M) then / ∗ t-th column of Y ∗ /
6. if CanonicalMatrix(Y) and notAnyRowOfYDominatesM(Y,M) then
7. Print(“It is not trade robust.”); return false
8. fi
9. else r := 1; t := t+ 1; aux := PartialSums(M, 1, k − 1, t, t)
10. {Adds up the yi,t integers, where 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1}
11. if notDoingForkTrade2(M,Y, n, r, t, aux) then return false fi
12. fi
13. else Maux := PartialSums(M, 1, k, t, t);Y aux := PartialSums(Y, 1, r, t, t)
14. for yr,t from 0 to min(nt,Maux− Y aux) do
15. if notDoingForkTrade(M,Y, n, r + 1, t, aux− yr,t) then
16. return false
17. fi
18. end
19. fi
20. return true
21. end
Unfortunately, the number of matrices associated to a fixed number n of
voters is huge for n > 8. However, the experiments are successful for a small
fixed number of columns (two or three) and for small numbers of voters (n < 9).
Table 1 provides a detailed classification of all complete simple games: the
number of complete games (briefly CG), the number of weighted games (briefly
WG), and the number of non k-invariant-trade robust but (k−1)-invariant-trade
robust games (non k-I-T-R, for short). Finally, the number of complete games
being non weighted is gathered in non invariant-trade robust games (I-T-R, for
short).
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CG 1 3 8 25 117 1171 44313
WG 1 3 8 25 117 1111 29375
non I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 60 14938
non 2-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 57 13915
non 3-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 3 1011
non 4-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
Table 1. Full classification of simple games for n < 8
In particular, n = 6 is the minimum number of voters required to achieve
simple games which are 2-I-T-R but not 3-I-T-R; n = 7 is the minimum number
of voters required to achieve simple games which are 3-I-T-R but not 4-I-T-R.
Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix enumerate all these extreme cases giving vector n,
matrix M and a matrix Y which fulfills equation in Definition 11 and shows a
failure to be k-I-T-R: k = 3 for n = 6, and k = 4 for n = 7.
3.3 A detailed analysis for simple games with two and three
columns
The huge number of simple games for more than 8 voters does not allow to
consider all simple games in a reasonable time. However, fixing a small number
of columns (two or three) we can do an exhaustive experimental study even
for 10 voters. In terms of simple games (voting systems) few columns mean the
existence of many equally desirable voters which is highly frequent.
For two columns, we have checked that all simple games with n ≤ 10 are
either I-T-R or non 2-I-T-R (see Table 2). For three columns we also have found
the full classification (see Table 3). We do not show particular examples because
of the lack of space.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CG 0 1 5 15 36 76 148 273 485 839
non 2-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 2 10 34 94 229
non 3-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2. Number of non k-I-T-R simple games with just two columns
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CG 0 0 0 6 50 262 1114 4278 15769 58147
non 2-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 6 130 1116 6858 35431
non 3-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 39 160 506
non 4-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 39 115
non 5-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 —–
Table 3. Number of non k-I-T-R simple games with just three columns
4 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have made experiments that allow:
(i) To classify all complete simple games, CG, for n < 8 according to they are:
WG, non 2-I-T-R, non 3-I-T-R and non 4-I-T-R.
(ii) To check if a particular complete simple game with n voters is k-I-T-R for
each positive integer k.
(iii) To study important subclasses, those with either one, two or three columns,
whenever n < 11.
The given results in (i) for n = 6, 7 are new as well as the results obtained in
(iii) for n > 5.
Our experiments suggest three important theoretical conjectures which we
are developing.
Conjecture 1. Any simple game with just two types of voters (two classes) is
either I-T-R or non 2-I-T-R.
Conjecture 2. Three columns are enough to find games which are (k − 1)-I-T-R
but non k-I-T-R for any positive integer k.
Conjecture 3. It is possible to find a game which is (k − 1)-I-T-R but non
k-I-T-R for any positive integer k, where the number of voters is O(k) instead
of k2 (cf. Theorem 2).
It is also interesting to study the required CPU time depending on the number
of voters, the number of columns. Even, to do an exhaustive analysis depending
on the number of rows (games with a single row are called complete simple games
with minimum and have been studied in [3]).
Another future work is, for a fixed number of voters n, to generate a random
game (n,M) and study trade robustness.
Finding appropriate weights for voters and a quota (a realization), for the
class of WG.
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Appendix
This appendix shows the specific examples which are (k − 1)-I-T-R but non
k-I-T-R for the highest value of k and for n = 6, 7.
Vector n Matrix M Matrix Y
( 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 )
0@ 1 0 0 1 0 10 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0
1A 0@ 0 0 1 1 1 10 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0
1A
Vector n Matrix M Matrix Y Vector n Matrix M Matrix Y
( 1, 1, 1, 2, 1 )
0@ 1 0 0 1 10 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 2 0
1A 0@ 0 0 1 2 10 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0
1A ( 1, 1, 2, 2 ) „ 1 0 0 2
0 1 1 1
« 0@ 0 0 2 20 1 0 2
1 1 0 0
1A
Table 4. Non 3-I-T-R simple games for n = 6
Vector n Matrix M Matrix Y Matrix M Matrix Y Matrix M Matrix Y Matrix M Matrix Y
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
0B@ 101000110010100101011
0011101
1CA
0B@ 001101101110001000111
1001001
1CA
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2)
0@ 110002101011
011102
1A
0B@ 011012100112101002
111000
1CA
(1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1)
0@ 100010010011
001101
1A 0@ 000211001011
011000
1A
(1, 1, 1, 2, 2)
0@ 1000201102
01021
1A
0B@ 001220101201012
11000
1CA
(1, 1, 2, 1, 2)
„
10011
01102
« 0B@ 002120101210002
11000
1CA
0@ 1000201011
00202
1A
0B@ 001120011201002
11000
1CA
0@ 1101010012
01102
1A
0B@ 002120101211001
11001
1CA
0@ 1101010200
01102
1A
0B@ 002120120011001
11001
1CA
(1, 1, 2, 2, 1)
0@ 1002101101
00220
1A
0B@ 002110021101021
11000
1CA
0@ 1010110020
01021
1A
0B@ 002211001110011
11000
1CA
(1, 2, 2, 2)
„
1010
0102
« 0B@ 002202001001
1001
1CA „ 11020221
« 0B@ 021202121022
1200
1CA
(2, 2, 3)
„
210
103
« 0B@ 023201201
201
1CA
(2, 3, 2)
„
102
031
« 0B@ 022022022
200
1CA
Table 5. Non 4-I-T-R simple games for n = 7
